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3Introduction
Alan James ("History of Peacekeeping: An Analytic
Perspective") provided a classification of the variety of
types of peacekeeping in terms of the form and function of
such efforts. Was the conflict ideological or one of ethnic
conflict, or had there been a massive violation of human
rights? Was the peacekeeping operation one of enforcement or
one of a good will ambassador and counsellor coming between
warring parties? Was it a border operation or one which fell
within the jurisdiction of a sovereign state? What was the
purpose of the peacekeepers if they did operate within the
territorial jurisdiction of a state?
If Alan James provided a classificatory analysis that
stressed the continuity of peacekeeping operations since WW
II, Tom Weiss ("Peacekeeping Since 1985") offered a conceptual
analysis and a somewhat different classification that stressed
the discontinuity between the increased number of peacekeeping
operations of the last few years and those that predated them
because his focus was not on the form and function of the
peacekeeping operations primarily, but on the local authority
granting permission for the peacekeeping initiative. The
Agenda for Peace does not mention the term, "intervention"
once, but the new type of peacekeeping operation in northern
Iraq, in Somalia, in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and even in Cambodia
have been interventionist operations without the consent of
any or all the parties to the conflict. Further, parties to
the conflict have been political or ethnic groups which had no
constituted authority of any kind.
Phillippe Kirsch ("Legal Issues") complemented Tom
Weiss's distinctions by filling in the legal aspects to
differentiate classical peacekeeping from the expanded
operations that have emerged since 1988 and a new third type
which operates in an unprecedented environment where the
peacekeepers are no longer present as a result of the formal
consent of the conflicting parties and are present within the
borders of a state with both a more proactive role and greater
risk to the peacekeepers. Hence, the rules of engagement
differ. Further, the peacekeepers may be there as much to
protect civilians as to keep the warring parties apart. Thus,
the peacekeepers may have different functions, such as
providing security for humanitarian assistance and safe
havens. The prohibition against interference in the domestic
affairs of a state has been set aside somewhat in the new
peacekeeping mode.
Complementing these theoretical and historical papers
have been a series of much more grounded presentations - case
studies of Cyprus and the Western Sahara, a detailed analysis
4of the high cost and multiplication of these new operations
and the inadequate resources to pay for them while the UN
itself was expanding its responsibilities in the protection of
the environment, human rights and the provision of
humanitarian relief which have added to the pressures on the
infrastructure and personnel of the UN, and the innovative
steps that are underway to develop the intelligence, planning,
chain of command, decision making and communication capacity
of the UN to respond to these new challenges.
In the alternating provision of an intellectual framework
for looking at the issues and much more grounded analysis in
terms of actual operations, this paper will weigh in on the
side of a theoretical analysis. However, instead of providing
an analysis and classification of peacekeeping operations in
terms of form, function, political theory and legal practice,
this paper will attempt to provide an answer to the two
questions raised by Ambassador Louis Frechette. In what
situations should the international community intervene when
there are a multitude of ethnic conflicts and civil wars on
this earth, when intervention no longer follows the classical
policy of requiring the agreement of the parties to the
conflict and where ethnic groups or ideological enemies may be
at each others throats rather than between two different
states? Secondly, how should the international community
intervene? Or as Colonel John Bremner put both questions so
pithily, "Where are we going?" This paper offers to provide a
grundlegung, a grounding for the new modes of peacekeeping in
refugee theory.
A Philosophical Preface - the Kantian Vision
Individuals and groups who carry the onerous burden of
peacekeeping and peacemaking deal with the gritty reality of
risking lives and protecting lives. Philosophers deal with
such esoteric subjects at what it means to live the good life.
It is difficult to be concerned about the good life when your
job is simply to protect the living.
Immanuel Kant, the great German philosopher who wrote at
the end of the eighteenth century, began his essay on
Perpetual Peace with these remarks: "The practical politician
(and I might add, the practical military officer or diplomat)
assumes the attitude of looking down with great self-
satisfaction on the political theorist as pedant whose empty
ideas in no way threaten the security of the state, inasmuch
as the state must proceed on empirical principles; so the
theorist is allowed to play his game without interference from
the worldly-wise statesman." If you think war is dangerous,
look at the danger of showing disdain and contempt or even
condescension for the realm of theory and playing with
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wrong course in executing Socrates just for being a
philosopher, they correctly discerned that philosophers are
very dangerous and insidious. Look at Immanuel Kant himself.
He introduced the idea of envisioning a peaceful world policed
by a League of Nations - surely the emptiest and most hair-
brained idea the world had heard to that date when the
governing principle of the world of international affairs was
that each state was merely responsible for its own security.
Beware of empty ideas. They have the habit of filling up with
action.
Philosophers are doubly insidious. We do not ask you to
accept our ideas because they are correct. We simply point
out, as Kant did in that seminal paper, that we are simply
asking worldly-wise statesmen, diplomats and military officers
to act consistently in the case of conflict. Beware not only
of the Ides of March and the ideas of philosophers, but of
requests that you be consistent in your actions.
With that warning label - namely, that philosophers as
well as cigarettes are dangerous to your health - let us
recall the content of the Kantian vision and the idea that I
believe has been singularly responsible in the realm of theory
for the role Canadians and others have been increasingly asked
to play as peacekeepers for the United Nations.
Kant wrote that, "there must be a league of peace (foedus
pacificum)." Though this central idea of Kant's is often
recalled, the two criteria he set for its implementation may
have been forgotten. Kant went on to distinguish a league of
peace "from a treaty of peace (pactum pacis) by the fact that
the latter terminates only one war, while the former seeks to
make an end of all wars forever." The long term goal was not
just an armistice or even simply a peace treaty between the
warring parties, but each peacekeeping operation should be
assessed in terms of whether or not it contributes or detracts
from the long term goal of terminating war altogether. Kant
went onto say that, "This league does not tend to any dominion
over the power of the state itself and of other states in
league with it." (356) The immediate goal was not dominion
over the state but merely the maintenance of freedom and
security. The inhabitants of the state itself had to remain
responsible for reconstructing their civil society and
reestablishing the government. I remind you of these two
criteria which were set out in the first vision of an
international peacekeeping force.
Ambassador Louise Frechette raised the question about
guidelines about where to intervene and how to intervene given
the multitude of conflicts around the world. Kant provided two
6guidelines. In the answer to where, you have to ask the
question whether the intervention will advance the day when we
can live on this earth without war. That is the security
criterion. Secondly, with respect to the issue of how, the
answer is to establish law and order not to be king of the
castle, but to establish law and order so that humans in that
area are free to establish their own governments and develop
their own civil societies. The choice of where to provide
peacekeepers must be guided by whether the operation
contributes to the long term goal of terminating war
altogether. The choice of how to introduce a peacekeeping
operation must be guided by the principle that the league of
peace must not seek dominion over a society but only the
security so that the people of that society are free to choose
their own government and construct their own civil society.
The Kantian vision was a product of the historical
imagination, a created world, a self-contained entity which
serves as an end-in-itself. Kant was not concerned with a
possible world in the sense of alternative events and actions
that could have happened instead of what actually did happen.1
Kant was concerned with a possible future world. What I now
want to show, however sketchily, is how, in the twentieth
century, we have witnessed the application and development of
this possible idea through four different actual phases in the
development of international refugee policy. These are not
arbitrary phases, but stages in which "each and every element
has a specific role in the interrelated whole."2
An Historical Perspective on Refugees - Four Phases of
Development
The development of international policy with respect to
refugees in the twentieth century can be divided into four
phases, roughly separated by the four quartiles of this
century. These four phases in which the new international
refugee order has developed over the twentieth century to deal
                    
    1 Cf. Geoffrey Hawthorn, Plausible Worlds: Possibility and
Understanding in History and the Social Sciences, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991.
    2 José C. Bermejo-Barrera, "Explicating the Past," History
and Theory 32: Nov., 1993, p. 21. Bermeyo-Barrera has written
a number of books in Spanish on the philosophy of history -
Psicioánalisis del conocimiento histórico (Madrid, 1982), El
Final de la Historia Teórica (Madrid, 1987), Replanteamiento
de la Historia: Eassayos de Historia Teórica II (Madrid,
1989), and Fundamentación lógica de la Historia (Madrid,
1991).
7with the flow of refugees and provide humanitarian assistance
may be summarized as follows.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO REFUGEE FLOWS




Interim Repatriation (of DPs) versus Resettlement (of
refugees)
Phase III Protection for individuals who were outside the
borders of their home state and who had a well-founded
fear of persecution
Humanitarian and settlement assistance for those in 
refugee-like situations
Phase IV Stemming flows of Refugees
In the period before and immediately after the Great War,
or what later became known as World War I, there was still
empty land where refugees could flee to start a new life. The
whole earth had not yet been carved up into political entities
divided by borders with controls to limit entry and
resettlement. Individuals who suffered under one political
jurisdiction could flee to and resettle in another
jurisdiction. Individuals and families fled to a jurisdiction
where they would not be persecuted. It was a period of
spontaneous self selection and self-settlement where the
opportunities were open and the responsibility for seeking and
finding a safe haven rested with the refugees themselves.
The second phase began after World War I when the vision
of a world without war was first broadcast as a goal of
politics under the leadership of Woodrow Wilson. Recall the
context. The population of the world was about 1 billion
people at the turn of the century. (Now it is about 5.6
billion.) After the first world scale "total war", there had
been an estimated 60 million casualties.3 6% of the world's
                    
    3 "The final casualty list for this extended period might
have been as much as 60 million people, with nearly half of
these losses occurring in Russia, and with France, Germany,
and Italy also being badly hit." Paul Kennedy, The Rise and
Fall of the Great Powers, New York: Random House, 1987, p.
278.
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in battle and civilian casualties from hunger and disease,
particularly the killer flu epidemic of 1918-19. The economies
of the European states had been devastated. The Great War was
to be the last war, the war to end all wars. There was to be a
new world order. The League of Nations was founded.
But wars continued to break out. In particular, the
Greeks and Turks murdered one another and engaged in 'ethnic
cleansing'. In that post WWI4 period the international
community utilized three very different permanent solutions to
deal with the flow of refugees from ethnic conflict, which was
the major source then of war rather than economics or
political ideology - redrawing borders, forcefully exchanging
populations while attempting to provide international
guarantees for minorities. Rather than placing peace keeping
forces between the Greek and Turks as we now might attempt to
do, the international community simply facilitated the
separation of the two communities. Asia Minor, for example,
was expunged of its large Greek population in 1923. (Marrus,
pp. 96-109) Where separation and partition were not seen as
practicable, as was the case in the flight of the Armenians
from the mass murder and persecution by the Turks, the League
of Nations acted to assist in their resettlement. (Marrus, pp.
74-81; 119-121)
Resettlement was the core approach to refugees who fled
as a result of ideological conflict, such as the 800,000
Russians throughout Europe in 1921 or the 10,000 Italian anti-
fascists who resettled in France in the 1930s. However, when
the problem was ethnic persecution on a massive scale and it
was no longer perceived to be practicable for countries mired
in the great depression to accept refugees, borders were
closed. The High Commission for Refugees had been established
in 1933 to deal with these refugees, but James G. McDonald
resigned in 1935 in protest at the very few resettlement
places available to deal with the refugees and the
unwillingness of the international community to tackle the
problem at its source. (Marrus, pp. 161-166) Even the Evian
Conference in 1938, specifically called to deal with the
Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany in a carefully orchestrated
public relations exercise, affirmed the rights of governments
to limit the intake of refugees on the basis of whether they
were likely to be able to reestablish themselves given the
absorptive capacity of the receiving state. (Marrus, pp. 166-
207)
                    
    4 Though the categorization is mine alone, the factual
information is largely drawn from Michael Marrus, The Unwanted
- European Refugees in the Twentieth Century, 1985.
9Even after the end of World War II, the policy of forced
repatriation continued. The Potsdam Agreement5 made provision
and the allies implemented the forced repatriation of the
Oeustdeutsch who had lived in Poland, Czechoslovakia and
Hungary for generations - when the exodus from Russia and the
Baltic states are included it is estimated that 11 million
Germans were repatriated to the devastated economy of a
Germany with a population of only 40,000,000 people at the
time. The Yalta Agreement of February, 1945,6 provided for the
repatriation of Soviet citizens without obtaining their
consent, a provision which was largely but not entirely
implemented.
However, it must be recalled that if people were
forcefully repatriated, they were not called refugees. For if
you were scheduled for repatriation, you were not a refugee,
but were formally referred to as Displaced Persons. The debate
over nomenclature focused on the International Refugee
Organization (IRO).7  UNRRA, the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Agency set up at the end of 1943, was not
authorized to deal with or find solutions for refugees who
"who cannot return to their homes."8 UNRRA dealt with DPs.
                    
    5 Cf. A. de Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam: the Anglo-Americans
and the Expulsion of the Germans, 1977. See also Marrus, pp.
326-331.
    6 N. Tolstoy, Victims of Yalta, 1977 and Mark R. Elliott,
Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in Their
Repatriation, Chicago, 1982.
    7 Cf. Roger Zetter, "Labelling Refugees: Forming and
Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity," (Journal of Refugee
Studies, 4:1, November, 1991) where Roger uses the case of
Cyprus to indicate the important consequences of labelling.
For the history of UNRRA, see Louise Holborne, The
International Refugee Organization: A Specialized Agency of
the United Nations - Its History and Work 1946-1952, London,
1956.
    8 UN doc. A/C.3/SR.1-11. Cf. George Woodbridge, UNRRA: the
History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration, 3 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1950) Marrus estimated UNRRA was responsible for returning
almost 2 million refugees which still left 650,000 without
homes. (p. 320) See also Kim Salomon, "The Cold War Heritage:
UNRRA and the IRO as Predecessors of the UNHCR," in Göran
Rystad, ed. The Uprooted: Forced Migration as an International
Problem in the Post-War Era, Lund University Press, 1990. For
a guide to UNRRA archival sources see Marilla B. Guptil,
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In the IRO constitution, set up to succeed UNRRA and to
escape the agreements to forcefully repatriate people, a
distinction was made between refugees -- pre-or post- war
victims of Nazi or fascist regimes or of racial, religious or
political persecution -- and displaced persons (DPs) who were
displaced in the course of or after World War II.  With
respect to DPs, the IRO was "to encourage and assist in every
possible manner the early return to their countries of
origin".9  If Jews were classified as DPs, the IRO would be
expected to arrange for their repatriation. "A DP may be
defined as a person displaced by war but wishing to return
home once the fighting is over. A refugee, on the other hand,
may be defined as a person who has fled home and who does not
wish to return, at least not to the circumstances which
occasioned flight."10
The end of the second phase of international refugee
policy can be characterized by induced resettlement for a
population which could not be repatriated by either force or
international law and norms. The treatment of the Jews and the
Palestinian Arabs characterized this shift.
If Jews were classified as refugees, then Palestine was
the obvious place for them to be resettled, given the terms of
the Mandate and the limitation of other options.  As the
Report of the High Commissioner for Refugees submitted to the
Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the League of Nations
Assembly had noted, "Palestine alone has made a contribution
of any size' in reference to large-scale or group settlement
of Jews.11
The Arab countries, led by Egypt and supported by
Britain, first attempted to set repatriation as the goal of
the IRO for all persons, whether refugees or DPs.  Mr. Kamel,
the delegate of Egypt12, proposed amending paragraph 2 of the
                                                               
"Records of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration, 1943-1948," Journal of refugee Studies, 5:1,
No. 1, 1992.
    9Annex 1, para. 1(b), Draft Constitution of the IRO,
A/127.
    10 Solomon 1990, p. 159.
    11Records of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the
League of Nations, p. 232.
    1221st meeting of the Third Committee of the United Nations
General Assembly of the United Nations on November 12, 1946.
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Preamble of the Draft Constitution of IRO to require serious
reasons to justify resettlement. Though defeated, the British
delegate led the opposition to the provision13 (which passed)
defining German and Austrian residents of Jewish origin as
"refugees". Britain based its case on the ostensibly high
moral principle that this was merely a backhanded attempt to
clear Europe of its Jews, in other words to accomplish
Hitler's goal of making the German-speaking parts of Europe
"Judenrein".14  The main Arab effort then shifted to prevent
resettlement of Jews in Palestine by placing specific
conditions on resettlement, such as preventing resettlement
where the Jews "will create political difficulties in the
countries of resettlement or in neighbouring countries" or
where resettlement is undertaken "without the consent of the
peoples of the countries of reception and without full
consultation with the States members of the United Nations
most directly concerned".15  These efforts were also defeated
as were a number of other subsequent efforts.
The Arabs, backed by the British, were defeated in the
attempt to make repatriation the exclusive function of the IRO
or to include Jews in those slated for repatriation.  Even
when repatriation was argued on the highest morals grounds of
equality, non-discrimination and the opposition to a Europe
free of Jews, the Arabs and British were unable to succeed in
targeting the Jews for what would have been forced
repatriation. When the major efforts focused on resettlement,
the Arabs and British were unable to hedge the resettlement
plans with conditions which would exclude Palestine as a
target area for resettlement of the remnant of European Jews.
Instead a policy of resettlement which, in the case of the
Jews, was forced upon the majority of the inhabitants of the
area in which they were to be resettled. In the case of the
Palestinian Arabs, a policy of resettlement was adopted
without the consent of the Palestinians to be resettled. The
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East (UNRWA) was set up ostensibly to provide
interim aid and employment, but, in reality, to resettle the
Palestinian refugees in the Arab states under the guise of
economic integration.
If the first phase of the international policy of dealing
with refugees had been characterized by open borders, the
second phase was characterized by drawing new borders and
dividing ethnic populations on different sides of the border
                    
    13of Annex 1, Part 1, Section H, para. 3.
    14A/C.3/61; A/C.3?68, p. 5, 9.
    15E/86, p. 6.
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while guaranteeing the protection of minorities left on the
wrong side. The partition of Palestine was the last effort in
that phase of solving a refugee policy. As the last phase, a
new state for the Jews was created, Israel, and an almost
fifty year legacy of Palestinian refugees without a state to
guarantee their protection remained.
In contrast to the first phase of international refugee
policy, the period was characterized by redrawn rather than
open borders, by forced repatriation and resettlement rather
than the voluntary free movement of people, and by a system in
which the international community accepted the responsibility
for protecting minorities within the jurisdiction of a state
and for provision of their essential needs when they were
outside the jurisdiction of a state in which the refugees were
members. It was a period characterized by a plethora of
international refugee organizations, each set up to deal with
a specific refugee problem - much as we now have a plethora of
acronyms for peacekeeping operations each set up to deal with
a specific conflict area - rather than developing a generic
institutional approach to deal with all refugees. UNRWA was
the last of these institutional creations.
The Mandate of the UNHCR
The Convention of the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees of 1951 moved away from regarding refugees en masse
to focus on them as persecuted individuals, moved away from
assistance to legal protection, and focused only upon those
who were already outside the borders of their country of
origin in spite of the pleas by Greece, India and Pakistan
that the mandate include those displaced by civil war, the
latter arguing that those suffering from disease and
starvation were much worse off than those suffering
persecution. Eleanor Roosevelt led the debate and successful
resolution that a genuine refugee was one who was outside
his/her country of origin and had fled because of a well
founded fear of persecution on a number of grounds. Such
refugees would be guaranteed that (s)he would not be
repatriated to the country where the individual had been
persecuted. To be a refugee was a guarantee that an individual
outside his or her own country and so labelled would not be
returned to that country. It was a refugee regime built on two
principles - the human rights of the individual and the
sacrosanct character of the borders of the political state.
Because the original solution to the refugee problem focused
on resettlement, the other solution offered was voluntary
repatriation; the compulsory exchange of populations of the
post WWI period had been rejected.
Instead of open or shifting borders, borders were
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reified. You were only a refugee if you were outside the
jurisdiction of the state that had the historical
responsibility of providing for an individual's protection.
Forced solutions were given up in favour of ostensible
voluntarism. But it was no longer the voluntarism of the first
part of the century when there were a large number of states
in which refugees could resettle. It was a voluntarism which
depended on the willingness of states to also volunteer both
to support the UNHCR financially and to provide opportunities
for the persecuted individuals to resettle. Instead of a
system of the individual seeking the protection of a state or
the international community ostensibly guaranteeing the
protection of minorities, the international community through
the UNHCR guaranteed the protection of individuals who had
been persecuted and who had not yet been accepted by a state
which would assume responsibility for their protection.
Most refugees did not require that individual protection.
They were accepted en masse because they fled states regarded
as enemy states with antithetical values and norms. Those
fleeing communism and the confines of the Iron Curtain were
resettled in the West. States, in particular the United
States, Australia and Canada, perceived refugees in
ideological political terms. If you fled a communist regime,
you were a refugee. In 1956 and 1968 refugees who had fled
from Hungary and Czechoslovakia were accepted en masse by
these countries of immigration and refugee resettlement. The
refugees did not have to be communists. At the end of that
period, Canada took in over 100,000 American draft dodgers and
deserters from the Vietnam War because Canada wanted to
differentiate itself from the behemoth to its south engaged in
a war with which Canadians largely disagreed, though Canada
never had the courage to designate that intake as a refugee
flow.
The last phase of the development of international
refugee policy and practice began in 1973. Idi Amin began the
practice of ethnic cleansing. Chile began the practice of
ideological cleansing. The Ugandan Asians were expelled and
Western states resettled its first group of refugees en masse
who were neither fleeing communism nor European. The
socialists and communists who opposed Pinochet were allowed to
leave from their sanctuaries in various embassies and were
also resettled. The beginning of a non-racist, non-ideological
refugee regime had begun. Of the 35,000 Ugandan Asians and
35,000 Chilean refugees, Canada took in and resettled about
20% of each of those groups.
When the Communist government after its capture of the
south began practices which led to a more subtle form of
ethnic cleansing of the Vietnamese Chinese and ideological
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cleansing of dissenters in the former South Vietnam, a massive
resettlement of what would number over a million refugees was
begun in the late seventies and early eighties. This was on
top of the massive flows of refugees into neighbouring states
as refugees from Cambodia, from a plethora of states in
Africa, from Afghanistan into Pakistan and Iran, from Cuba
into Florida, settled temporarily or permanently in their
first countries of asylum.
During the eighties, the numbers seeking asylum grew
exponentially. The development of human rights laws within
Western states provided increased protection that refugee
claimants who arrived spontaneously would be given the
protection of due legal process under domestic legal
requirements. By the late eighties, western states were
inundated with spontaneous influxes of individuals claiming
refugee status in a system which was only conceived and
designed to handle asylum claimants in the hundreds. Laws and
regulations were passed throughout the western states who were
signatories to the Convention to both provide legal processes
for dealing with those claimants while the search began for
means to stem the tide. States were both legally obligated to
accept these refugees if they satisfied the criteria. At the
same time, refugee claimants who did not satisfy the
requirements were either legally deported or prevented by
legal means (visas, fines on airlines, interdiction outside
the borders of one's state, etc.) from arriving in the first
place.
For example, the OECD conference in March of 1993 in
Madrid on Migration and Development attempted to examine
whether development aid would assist in stemming the tide of
migrants - economic and political. Development assistance as a
method of stemming the flows of hordes of unwanted migrants
seemed to be put on the back burner once it was recognized
that in the short and medium terms the flow of migrants would
actually increase as a result of such efforts.
The four phases of development of refugee policy
witnessed a shift from relatively open borders, to a policy of
altering borders in the areas of conflict, to a system of
sacrosanct and fixed borders where those who crossed borders
had either to await repatriation, integrate in the first
country of asylum or be resettled. When the latter demand
seemed to overwhelm the supply of spaces the West seemed
willing to provide, sacrosanct borders became increasingly
closed borders as the borders of other states were redrawn, de
facto if not de jure. The four phases were characterized by:
voluntary resettlement; forced repatriation and resettlement;
voluntary repatriation, settlement and resettlement; and
legally obligatory resettlement, repatriation and settlement
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within the country of origin though perhaps in a different
area than one's home. The responsibility for protection
shifted from the individual to an international theoretical
system for minority protection, an actual system for
individual legal protection, and protection of minority groups
either through total resettlement or repatriation in a
protected haven where they could act as a self-determining and
governing majority. The historical development of the
international refugee regime and a comparison of the four
phases can be summarized in the following chart.
Phases of Development of the International refugee Regime
Phase I II III IV
Borders  Open   Alterable   Sacrosanct  Altered &
Closed
Solution Resettlement Forced   Voluntary     Militarily
  Repatriation   Repatriation  Enforced
  &              &             Repatriation




Protection Self       International  International
International
  re Minorities  legal re      of Nations
  Individuals   in situ
I now want to examine the contradictions of international
policy with respect to refugee flows in four distinct areas of
international humanitarian military intervention - Iraq,
Cambodia, Somalia and Yugoslavia.
Refugees and Peacekeeping
Since the end of the Cold War, the international
community has experimented with safe havens in Iraq and the
former Yugoslavia, and the delivery of humanitarian aid
protected by international troops inside countries of conflict
without the permission of any formal state authority as in
Somalia. International troops and observers are present in
Cambodia to oversee the reestablishment of both a civil
society and a state regime to keep the peace. While the
international community dithers over Bosnia-Hercegovina, as we
watch day after day on our television screens the slaughter of
helpless civilians and hear tales of their brutal treatment,
particularly of women, the West debates extending humanitarian
military intervention to the killing grounds of Bosnia. In an
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effort at preventive peacekeeping, troops have been sent to
the borders of Macedonia to prevent the spread of the Yugoslav
imbroglio and a consequent larger flow of refugees.
The link between peacekeeping and refugees begins after
the end of the Cold War in the latter part of the fourth phase
of the above development of the international refugee regime
when peacekeeping moves out of its classical phase of
interposing blue helmets between two contending parties and
peacekeepers move into the interior of states without the
consent of any or all parties to a conflict and where there
may have even been a total disintegration of a unified state
authority. To analyze this connection, the four cases of Iraq,
Yugoslavia, Somalia and Cambodia can be distinguished by two
criteria - whether the states are multi-national or
predominately nation-states, and whether the states have
recognized governments in place which may be in the process of
being challenged by a militant opposition, or whether there is
an absence of a single recognized authority over the whole
state or area and there is a presence of competing groups
seeking authority through the barrel of a gun. The following 2
by 2 chart differentiates the four case studies.
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Nationalism Unitary    ! Multi--
   !
Government in Power Cambodia    ! Iraq
_________________________________________________________
__________
   !
No Governing Power Somalia    ! Former 
   !    Yugoslavia
Iraq and the Kurds
Prior to the termination of the Cold War and the effort
to establish a new international world order following the
invasion by and defeat of Iraq in Kuwait, there was an
uprising by the Kurds against the rule of Saddam Hussein. The
intact Iraqi army began to quell the rebellion and the Kurds
were forced into the hills as they were turned back from the
borders of Turkey but not the borders of Iran. Prior to the
Gulf War, the Turks might have been accused by the
international community for closing its borders to the
persecuted Kurds. Instead, the United States obtained
international sanction to create safe havens for the Kurds in
northern Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for the
development of an autonomous de facto state of Kurdistan under
international protection but without international
recognition. The old consultative assembly building in Irbil
for the powerless Kurd assembly has been renovated to house
the Kurdish parliament. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
under the leadership of Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) under Maoud Barzani's leadership have
done the unthinkable, merged their peshmerga forces into a
single national army. The Kurds have created a legislative arm
and the political authorities of the nascent state has been
given the monopoly over the use of coercive force. They even
have a foreign policy. In return for cooperating with the
Turks in the crushing of the Kurdish rebels within Turkey, the
Turkish armed forces provide logistic support to the nascent
Kurdish state all under the auspices of a humanitarian relief
effort to provide a safe haven for the Kurds.
The international community says that no state should
refoule a refugee fleeing persecution. When they are
forcefully prevented from seeking asylum, the international
community did not condemn those guilty of refoulement, but
intervened to provide protection for the Turkish border and
for the Kurdish minority within the supposedly sacrosanct
borders of the nation-state of Iraq, reinforcing thereby a
quasi separatist state.16 The international community in the
                    
    16 Cf. Adelman, "Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the
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name of sacrosanct borders and the integrity of the state of
Kuwait ordered Iraq to be attacked. In the aftermath of that
victory, the international community still upheld the
sacrosanct character of state borders but has been the major
instrument for the de facto division of Iraq.
Cambodia
Cambodia is renowned the world over for its infamous
killing fields and the estimated one and one half million
Cambodians killed when the Khmers Rouges occupied the seat of
government in Phnom Penh. When they were driven out by the
Vietnamese, they retained some control in north-western
Cambodia and took control of the large camps within Thailand
which housed "refugees" whom the Thais had refused to allow to
be designated formally as refugees. With the agreement among
the four contending parties in Cambodia at the end of 1991 to
end hostilities and attempt to create a government, The United
Nations committed three billion dollars and over 20,000
peacekeepers to oversee the successful return of almost
400,000 refugees and the recreation of a civil and political
order in Cambodia.
For the first time, even the Japanese agreed to
contribute peacekeeping forces. With great difficulty, the
Japanese reversed their postwar ban against sending Japanese
troops onto foreign territory Peacekeepers were sent under the
auspices of UNTAC, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia,
to ensure a peaceful election of a constitutional assembly on
May 23-25, 1993. But the decision was dependent on both sides
agreeing to the Japanese role.
The Khmers Rouges abrogated the agreement. They refused
to disarm or take part in the election. At the end of January
of this year, the Phnom Penh government in a military
preventive action to stop an alleged Khmers Rouges dry season
offensive, attacked the Khmers Rouges at Siem Reap in the
north-west, at Kompong Thom in central Cambodia, at Kratie in
the central eastern area of Cambodia and in a major thrust
against the Khmers Rouges headquarters at Pailin along the
Thai border. The Khmers Rouges struck back. They began their
own process of ethnic cleansing by attacking Vietnamese
settlements in Cambodia, beginning with the murder of 34
Vietnamese on March 9th in the floating village on the Tonle
Sap river in the area ostensibly controlled by the
undisciplined Bulgarian peacekeepers who have been accused of
sexually harassing and raping Cambodian women and ignoring
                                                               
Kurds," International Journal of Refugee Law, Volume 4, No. 1,
April 1992 and "The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention: The
Case of the Kurdish Refugees," Public Affairs Quarterly,
"Special Issue on Refugees," Volume 6, Issue 1, January 1992.
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Cambodian traffic laws. Subsequent attacks followed and a
number of the 400,000 Vietnamese in Cambodia have fled as even
the government party fails to even speak up for their
protection. 400,000 Cambodian refugees have been returned
under UN auspices. Are we witnessing the creation of 400,000
Vietnamese refugees under UN auspices in exchange? The Khmers
Rouges have attacked and killed Bulgarian peacekeepers and
even killed one Japanese policeman, in the process and raising
another hue and cry in Japan about the Japanese presence in
Cambodia. Even Phnom Penh is not immune from attack as grenade
attacks and firebombs are thrown at cafes in the capital.
Even more seriously, up to 100 election workers and
candidates have been murdered. Yasushi Akashi, the Japanese
head of UNTAC set up a special prosecutor to try two alleged
killers, a Phnom Penh policeman and a Khmers Rouges soldier,
but no actual trial seems to be in the offing. The UN has sent
in peacekeepers in a land where one of the parties openly
disavows electoral politics, has refused to surrender its arms
and blatantly attacks Vietnamese civilians, UN election and
humanitarian officials and the UN peacekeepers themselves. No
monopoly on the control and use of coercive force
has been established in Cambodia, the prerequisite to
developing a civil society and a government selected by and
responsible to the people.
What can the UN forces do after the election - withdraw
and watch a civil war break out or increase their numbers to
give the newly elected government a chance, assuming, of
course, that the electoral process works adequately enough for
a government to be considered as the legitimate representative
of the people.
The contradiction is the following. The UN claims to be
impartial and neutral between and among competing factions. In
fact, it is not partial at all. It is committed to a liberal
theory of responsible government and of individual human
rights. At the same time, it is committed to a stable order
based on the sovereignty of states with the state holding a
monopoly on the use of coercive power. But while the UN may
insist that a state have an elected form of government
responsible to and chosen by the people, the UN does little to
uphold the fact and the principle that any responsible
government must have a monopoly on the use of force. In the
hands of an irresponsible government, that monopoly can be
turned against the people themselves.
UN Authority and Somalia
The UN sent troops to police Somalia but they were
useless and had to stay in their barracks until they were
rescued by a much larger, better equipped US force sent not so
20
much to rescue Somalia from anarchy as to rescue the UN from
an impotent effort at peacekeeping. Since the American forces
have departed, reports emerge that the militant anarchy is
also returning. Given the stigma attached to the presence of
American forces, there is a reluctance on the part of the
Americans as well as the international community to rely on
the overwhelming power of the US, but without the presence of
that overwhelming power, the ability to repress those who
would resort to arms to resolve their differences seems to
diminish over time.
Further, in the anarchy of Somalia, a central authority
is needed to run the economy and institute a working judicial
system. The Economist has called for the UN to set itself up
as "king of the Somali castle." (March 6-12, p. 18) But this
is precisely what the people themselves must do. The UN must
not establish itself as king of the castle but as a praetorian
guard until the institutions of the civil society and the
political state are reestablished and strengthened. 
Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Hercegovina
How is the international community to navigate between
the Scylla of ethnic nationalism and the Charybdes of
sacrosanct sovereign states? How, as Patrick Moynihan recently
phrased the question (Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International
Politics, Oxford: OUP) can the world be made safe both for
ethnic groups and from ethnic fanaticism? (Cf. also Adelman,
"Ethnicity and Refugees," in World Refugee Survey, 1992, pp.
6-11.)
Can one really take seriously that the Croats, Serbs and
Muslim Bosnians could live in peace together successfully in a
reorganized federal state in line with the Vance-Owen peace
plan? Can the Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina really be expected
to surrender the contiguity and enlargement of their
territorial base in Bosnia-Hercegovina? How can those
territories be recreated as dominantly Muslim cantons when
they have already been ethnically cleansed and populated by
Serbs since under the latest version of the Vance-Owen plan,
Muslim forces will not be allowed to return? Though the
Security Council voted on February 22nd to set up a the first
special war crimes tribunal since Neurenberg, does anyone
expect any of the war criminals to be tried?
In other words, the peace plan says it provides for a
return to the status quo ante, but in the form of a federated
state, while everyone seems to recognize it really means the
international recognition of the separation of the ethnic
groups in accordance with the facts on the ground. Ethnic
cleansing at this late date will have been rewarded in the
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guise of an internationally imposed peace. Even the earlier
efforts of the United States to airdrop relief supplies in the
beginning of March was debated as a controversial move which
might arouse Serb aggression and stimulate attacks against the
lightly armed UN peacekeeping forces.
So 75,000 peacekeepers might be required to ostensibly to
keep peace between ethnic groups but, in reality, to recognize
the order of victory - the victory of Serbs over both Croats
and Muslims and the victory of the Croats over the Muslims.
The alternative to such a hypocritical peace plan is bombing
of Serb artillery, supply lines and supplies and perhaps
lifting the arms embargo on the Muslims. Alternatively, UN
peacekeepers could be sent into an unstable area to secure
safe havens for the refugees when it is difficult enough for
the UN troops to provide safe havens for themselves. The
obligations are difficult enough to sort out without raising
questions about the contradictory goals and the questionable
means of achieving a moral obligation of protecting civilians
from slaughter and rape.
Conclusion
There are numerous other areas where the UN could be sent
to keep the peace between and among warring ethnic factions,
warlords and tribes - the conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, in Myanmar, in South Africa, etc. In most of those
places, as in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Somalia, Kurdistan and
Cambodia, there is no real peace to keep. But at least the UN
troops may have inhibited more expansionist all-out wars. In
none of these areas is there a clearly defined political
objective within reach or honestly articulated. Each situation
is full of contradictions and controversy. The chances of
success is slim as Boutros Boutros Ghali promotes his new
Agenda for Peace.
The UN in the guise of creating safe havens for refugees
participates in the de facto partition of a country, the very
presence instigated in defence of the sacrosanct character of
state borders. The UN, in the attempt to create a neutral
ground for the creation of a democratic regime in Cambodia,
becomes a target for militants with both real and moral
bullets. The UN which began its history as the instrument for
decolonization, is urged on to become the instrument of neo-
colonial authority in Somalia. And in Bosnia-Hercegovina the
UN, through delay and procrastination, is destined to become
the authority which sanctions ethnic cleansing and guards the
reality on the ground as it deplores these same results
rhetorically.
The league of peace is not and cannot be in the business
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of stopping each and every war. It must, as Kant said, be in
the business of making an end of all wars forever. Two
criteria were proffered. The league (or the UN) cannot operate
as king of the castle, assuming dominion over the power of the
state even if only on an interim basis but must restrict its
efforts to the maintenance of freedom and security. The
inhabitants of the state itself have to remain responsible for
reconstructing their civil society and reestablishing the
government. Further, each peacekeeping operation should be
assessed in terms of whether or not it contributes or detracts
from the long term goal of terminating war altogether. The UN
can only do this if it sorts out whether it wants to be a
league of nations protecting ethnic groups and ensuring they
have a role in their own self-determination (there are over
5000 nations on this earth) or a league of states with
sacrosanct borders. Otherwise the UN will meander from one
insoluble quagmire to another.
Sacrosanct borders are not holding up action by the
international community when those borders have been made
porous by the indigenous population. The real question is
whether the international community is willing to risk the
lives of its citizens serving under UN auspices for a cause in
which there is no immediate or apparent security threat to
themselves, no vital economic interests, no military
aggression across a recognized international border of a
member of the UN.
It will only do so if there are clear moral guidelines
and goals for doing so. The UNHCR has moved fro protecting
refugees who have fled across a border to attempting to
protect displaced persons within a border, but it is not clear
about its mandate or the measures it must use to protect
minorities within such states. Until a clear guideline has
been established for both self-determination and for the
protection of minorities, and until the UN is willing to
assert its full powers to monopolize the use of coercive power
until states in conflict put their house in order, the UN will
continue to be hampered by contradictory normative conceptions
and ineffectual tools on the ground.
